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After nearly fifty years of mea culpas and explanatory additions, the 
biopsychosocial model is no closer to a life of its own. Bolton and 
Gillett give it a strong philosophical boost in The Biopsychosocial 
Model of Health and Disease, but they overlook the model’s deeply 
inconsistent position on dualism. Moreover, because metaphysical 
confusion has clinical ramifications in medicine, their solution 
sidesteps the model’s most pressing clinical faults. But the news is 
not all bad. We can maintain the merits of holism as we let go of the 
inchoate bag of platitudes that is the biopsychosocial model. We can 
accept holism as the metaphysical open door that it is, just a 
willingness to recognize the reality of human experience, and the 
sense in which that reality forces medicine to address biological, 
psychological, and social aspects of health. This allows us to finally 
characterize Engel’s driving idea in accurate philosophical terms, 
as acceptance of (phenomenal) consciousness in the context of 
medical science. This will not entirely pin down medicine’s stance 
on dualism, but it will position it clearly enough to readily improve 
patient care. 
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The biopsychosocial model (BPSM) has two central problems: one 
philosophical and one clinical. First, while the model turns away from 
reductive physicalism, proposing an alternative that brings subjective 
experience into the scope of medical science, its ontological position is, at 
best, unclear and, at worst, incoherent. Second, while the model demands 
a radical change in everyday practice––again, a broadening that will range 
over not only biological, but also psychological and social considerations–
–it fails to provide guidance as to what, exactly, a clinician should do to 
practice in a biopsychosocial way. 
 
In The Biopsychosocial Model of Health and Disease, Bolton and Gillett 
offer a convincing presentation of the BPSM, highlighting these 
fundamental problems in their own terms, then they set out to resolve them.  
The result, they suggest, is a BPSM rethought and reinvigorated, one with 
far more substantial ties to philosophy. The need for this kind of rethinking 
is very real, as the BPSM has become a kind of dogma for medicine, even 
if only in marketing, while its shortcomings remain severe. As Bolton and 
Gillett aptly put it, the result is a crisis for medicine’s foundations, one long 
in the making. 
 
Engel could not have hoped for a more enthusiastic effort at redemption, 
nearly fifty years into medicine’s biopsychosocial journey, and in many 
ways the effort is invaluable, even ingenious. Where Engel was vague (to 
put it kindly) about causal connections, Bolton and Gillett fill in the gaps, 
and in a way that brings the BPSM into current philosophical focus. Most 
valuable, I think, is their discussion of embodied cognition as a tool for 
fleshing out the scientific meaning of slogans like “mind-body 
integration”. More than that, authors provide a detailed and wide-ranging 
account of the kind of complex causal interdependence that can make the 
BPSM work as a matter of science. Even if we find fault with their account 
and its idiosyncrasies, its value will remain. The BPSM is so often framed 
as medicine’s softer side, while the evidence-based model fills the slot for 
hard science. That understanding is a mistake, and Bolton and Gillett will 
have made that clear even if their particular account of the science can be 
challenged. 
 
The BPSM, however, is not redeemed by this ingenuity. Philosophically 
speaking, while Bolton and Gillett devote most of the book to the 
intricacies of their causal picture across the biopsychosocial spectrum, the 
model’s most glaring, and most pressing, ontological failures are not 
recognized. Moreover, because medicine’s metaphysical confusions have 
powerful clinical ramifications, Bolton and Gillett’s solution to the clinical 
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problem also sidesteps the BPSM’s most pressing faults. I will address 
each of these issues in turn.   
 
In the end of the day, I will not suggest that Bolton and Gillett’s efforts 
have been wasted. I will suggest that they’ve been wasted on the BPSM.  
Nassir Ghaemi (2010, 213) is right, I think, that the BPSM is more a slogan 
than a model, and we’ve spent almost fifty years tacking on mea culpas 
and explanatory additions. None of these has begun to give the thing life 
as a model, because none have addressed, or could address, the radical 
inconsistencies that have grown out of Engel’s original philosophical 
confusions. But the news is not all bad. There is no reason why we cannot 
begin anew with a form of holism that takes what works from Engel and 
lets go of what fails. There is no reason why we cannot, from a clean slate, 
build a new model for holism that is philosophically sound, scientifically 
substantial and, above all, optimal for patient care. 
 
 
2. The Philosophical Problem 
 
Philosophically speaking, the simplest and most salient feature of the 
BPSM is an ontological expansion of medicine’s conceptual foundations.  
Whatever else we might say about the model as Engel presented it, it is 
clear that, according to the BPSM, traditional medicine’s exclusive focus 
on the physical body is misguided. To improve things, medicine must 
expand to recognize the inextricable place for mind, for experience, in the 
health of the whole person. 
 
From the perspective of current philosophy of mind, this idea is 
uncomplicated. It is a rejection of reductive physicalism in favor of some 
form of property dualism or nonreductive physicalism. Practically 
speaking, however––and in spite abundant research in philosophy since 
Engel’s time on alternatives to reductive physicalism––medicine’s 
conceptual foundations were not clarified by the BPSM. They were 
confused to an extent that the model itself cannot remedy.   
 
First, there is deep, pervasive inconsistency about the BPSM’s most basic 
ontological position––that is, its position on dualism (O’Leary 2020).  On 
one hand, in the simplest and most obvious terms, many in philosophy of 
medicine understand the model to be dualistic.  For example, Marcum 
suggests, citing Foss (2002), that “biomedicine is composed of a 
metaphysical position best defined as mechanistic monism”, while “the 
biomedical worldview is modified in humane medicine with a 
metaphysical position that is generally dualistic” (Marcum 2008, 394-95).  
Borrell-Carrio and colleagues see a similar picture in their twenty-five-
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year retrospective on the BPSM, concluding that “George Engel 
formulated the biopsychosocial model as a dynamic, interactional, but 
dualistic view of human experience” (Borrell-Carrio 2004, 581).   
 
On the other hand, in the borderlands between medicine and psychiatry, 
the BPSM is generally assumed to be defined by rejection of dualism. In 
“The persistence of mind-brain dualism in psychiatric reasoning about 
clinical scenarios”, for example, Miresco and Kirmayer explain that 
“Despite attempts in psychiatry to adopt an integrative biopsychosocial 
model (…) psychiatrists continue to operate according to a mind-brain 
dichotomy” (Miresco and Kirmayer 2006, 913). More than that, they 
define dualism as “the idea that the mind is somehow distinct from the 
brain and that its essence cannot be reduced to purely material and 
deterministic neurological mechanisms” (Mireseco and Kirmayer 2006, 
913). For those who see the model from this perspective, BPS ontology is 
characterized by opposition to dualism, by the idea that mind can “be 
reduced to purely material and deterministic neurological mechanisms”.   
 
Though Bolton and Gillett very clearly understand dualism as a problem 
to be overcome, and a problem that they do overcome with a “new post-
dualist framework”, the book provides no definition of dualism, no 
acknowledgement of the common perception that the BPSM is dualistic, 
and no effort to explain why that perception might be mistaken.   
 
Second, because inconsistency about dualism poses such a decisive threat 
to the coherence of the BPSM, we must investigate whether it can be 
understood in a way that accommodates both perspectives. Is it possible 
for one medical model to both accept and reject dualism? Perhaps, if it 
accepts one form of dualism while it rejects another, but a picture of that 
kind would require a clear and well-defined account of its position. Do we 
find such an account in Engel? Definitely not. In fact, when we take a 
closer look at Engel’s original characterization of the biomedical model, 
we can actually see how we’ve ended up with such deep ontological 
confusion. Engel straightforwardly insisted––not once, but consistently in 
all of his writings––that  
 
the biomedical model embraces both reductionism, the 
philosophic view that complex phenomena are ultimately 
derived from a single primary principle, and mind-body 
dualism, the doctrine that separates the mental from the 
somatic. (Engel 1977, 130)   
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This, unequivocally, is the malady that Engel sets out to remedy with the 
BPSM: not reductionism on its own, but reductionism in combination with 
dualism.  
 
Broadly speaking, these are diametrically opposed views. In the broadest, 
most unrefined sense, reductive physicalism and Cartesian dualism are 
mutually exclusive, so it’s not possible for Engel to be correct in framing 
the BMM as reductive dualism, or dualistic reductionism. In the broadest 
sense, then, the BPSM is aiming for an incoherent goal, setting out to 
reverse a position that was impossible in the first place.1 
 
Of course as proponents of the BPSM, we could take a more refined view 
of our ontological options. We could position ourselves between the poles 
of reductionism and Cartesian dualism with some form of property 
dualism, for example. Such a position would be a fine antidote to both of 
those polarities––but again, this would require quite a lot of philosophical 
refinement. We’d need to clarify, as Susan Schneider does, that while  
 
contemporary philosophy of mind sees the question of the 
nature of substance as being settled in favor of the physicalist 
(…) dualism about properties, by contrast, is regarded as being 
a live option. (Schneider 2012, 51) 
 
We’d need an explanation of the difference between Cartesian realism 
about minds and current realism about mental properties. Then we’d need 
a discussion of the difference between nonreductive physicalism (where 
we accept that mental properties are distinct from physical properties, but 
reject dualism), and naturalistic dualism (where we accept that mental 
properties are distinct from physical properties and accept dualism).    
 
Does Engel provide an account of this kind, where we can make sense of 
the model’s contradictory views on dualism through a more contemporary, 
more refined account of nonreductive alternatives? No, though these 
options really had not been laid out in clear terms when Engel was 
formulating the BPSM. Do we get an account of this kind in the 
“biopsychosocial ontology” that Bolton and Gillett promise to provide?  
Still, no. In fact, Bolton and Gillett fail to mention property dualism even 
once. In the brief passage that mentions nonreductive physicalism, they 
 
1 Bolton and Gillett eloquently explain that “physicalism and dualism are twins, one born straight after  
the other, combative from the start, each refuting the other, the one supported by the great edifice of 
modern mechanics, the other known immediately by experience, battling ever since” (Bolton and  
Gillett 2019, 27).  Unfortunately, while they often describe the pairing in the BMM as “physicalist 
reductionism aided by dualism”, they do not explain how it might be possible to hold both positions 
simultaneously.  
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dismiss the view, inexplicably, as a “purely ‘metaphysical’ doctrine”, one 
that “probably has given up on being much or anything to do with the 
sciences” (Bolton and Gillett 2019, 161). 
 
Third, we have been unable to resolve the BPSM’s ontological 
inconsistency because the term ‘dualism’ has been defined in a way that 
makes philosophical clarification impossible. This problem can be traced 
directly from Engel to Bolton and Gillett.   
 
The only way to make sense of the idea that reductionism and Cartesian 
dualism go hand and hand is to fudge the definition of dualism a bit. For 
Engel, as for his colleagues, as for most of those who’ve worked with the 
BPSM for the last forty years, dualism is not an ontological position, not a 
view on how many kinds of substances or properties exist. Engel’s brand 
of dualism is an epistemological position, a choice each of us can make in 
our thinking. When we separate mind and body in our thinking, we are 
dualists, and when we integrate them, we defeat dualism. Unfortunately, 
dualism is actually not an epistemological position. Dualism does not come 
and go depending on the ideas we prefer or the words we choose. If the 
world is dualistic, then two kinds of things exist in the world, no matter 
what we say or think or do in medical practice.   
 
Bolton and Gillett’s book is a productive example of this confusion and its 
catastrophic impact on medicine’s foundational clarity. Though authors 
promise at the start to provide a new ontology for the BPSM, and later they 
take themselves to have made good on that promise, like Engel, they pair 
dualism with reductionism, almost as a habit. Like Engel, they feel sure 
they’ve conquered dualism “when physical and mental health conditions 
are brought together (…) rather than being axiomatically separate” (Bolton 
and Gillett 2019, 109). Moreover, because, like Engel, they believe we 
settle the question of dualism when we choose not to separate mind and 
body in our language or practice, they entirely overlook the actual question 
of dualism, that is, the question of whether minds, or mental properties, 
exist.   
 
It’s important to be clear about why it’s philosophically problematic to 
define dualism as separation of mind and body in our thinking rather than 
as the existence of minds or mental properties. After all, dualists always do 
separate mind and body, so it will work out just fine to define it that way 
as long as we’re affirming dualism. The trouble arises when we reject 
dualism––because we can choose to reject separation of mind and body in 
our thinking as dualists, or as monists. Marcum (2008) and Borrell-Carrio 
et al. (2004), for example, both insist that while the BPSM is a dualistic 
model, one that recognizes both mind and body, it also demands that we 
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recognize them as unified, rather than separated, in the whole person. 
Miresco and Kirmayer (2006), on the other hand, insist that the BPSM is a 
monistic model. From their perspective, it’s a mistake to separate mind and 
body because all the world is physical.   
 
This is the source of the BPSM’s philosophical incoherence. We cannot 
begin to determine whether medicine is or is not dualistic unless we’re 
clear what that question means: does medicine’s understanding of health 
and healthcare require the existence of minds or, alternatively, mental 
properties? Once we’re clear about that, nonreductive physicalism and 
naturalistic dualism become instant candidates for holism’s ontological 
foundation. While it’s certainly possible to argue that both fail to make 
sense of the whole person in the way that Engel intended, or the way that 
medicine actually requires, these are the most widely accepted ways to 
make sense of a holistic vision in contemporary philosophy of mind. We 
cannot sort out medicine’s ontological foundations without considering 
them. 
 
Admirable as Bolton and Gillett’s picture of BPS causes may be, it will not 
stand as an account of BPS ontology until authors make direct use of it to 
resolve the BPSM’s pervasive inconsistency about dualism. To do so 
they’d need to recognize that, in the twenty-first century, the question of 
dualism is serious and meaningful, especially for medicine. It is the hard 
problem of accounting for the reality of experience in the context of 
science (Chalmers 1995). More than that, they’d need to acknowledge that, 
like Engel, they do help themselves to the reality of experience as central 
to a sound understanding of health and healthcare.  
 
Fourth and finally, any effort to provide a workable ontology for the BPSM 
must address incoherence in its central claims about mind and body.   
 
(a) The first step and most important step toward an 
ontologically coherent picture of the BPSM is to clarify a 
consistent definition of dualism within the terrain that 
characterizes contemporary philosophy of mind. That, on its 
own, would be a monumental accomplishment for philosophy 
of medicine, one that would reverberate productively through 
all the medical professions.   
 
(b) Second, we need an explanation of why medicine should 
reject dualism, if, in fact, it should––because rejection of 
dualism does not go without saying in philosophy of mind, 
surprising as that may be to many in the medical professions. 
Because the question on the table in philosophy is about 
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property dualism rather than substance dualism (generally 
speaking), and, generally speaking, philosophy of mind has 
accepted the reality of mental properties, rejection of dualism 
does now require clarification and support. In any area of 
discourse that depends on recognition of experience qua 
experience, as the BPSM certainly does, it is absurd to proceed 
as if rejection of dualism goes without saying. 
 
(c) Third, because separating mind and body certainly does not 
make us dualists, not in philosophy of mind, we need a 
discussion of the merits and drawbacks of separating them in 
medicine. The fact is that, by and large, philosophers of mind 
are comfortable distinguishing mental properties from physical 
properties. To put that a different way, by and large, philosophy 
of mind has accepted a real distinction between experiences 
and the brain states with which they’re correlated. “Separation 
of mind and body”, is not a problem in philosophy, at least not 
prima facie. If we want to propose that it’s a problem for 
medicine, either metaphysically or clinically, that idea that will 
require clarification and support.  
 
While it is certainly possible to address these three issues, it is hard to 
imagine any way that we might institute revisions on these points in 
everyday thinking about the BPSM in medicine, psychiatry or bioethics.  
After fifty years of incoherent wrangling about mind and body, that is to 
say, the BPSM has come to be defined by its entrenched philosophical 
inconsistency. Though we surely can repair medicine’s conceptual 
foundations, we will need to see the result as an alternative form of holism, 
a better form of holism than what we get with the BPSM. I will make some 
broad points about that project in Part 4, but first it’s important to track the 
BPSM’s ontological confusion as it actually plays out at the level of 
clinical practice.  
 
 
3. The Clinical Problem 
 
In addition to the formidable challenge of ontological incoherence, the 
BPSM also faces a practical challenge, that it “lacks specific content, is too 
general and vague” (Bolton and Gillett 2019, 29) at the level of clinical 
application. Ghaemi suggests that while the addition of psychological and 
social considerations do provide greater freedom and complexity in 
diagnosis and treatment 
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[t]his eclectic freedom borders on anarchy: one can emphasise 
the ‘bio’ if one wishes, or the ‘psycho’ (…) or the ‘social’. But 
there is no rationale why one heads in one direction or the other: 
by going to a restaurant and getting a list of ingredients, rather 
than a recipe, one can put it all together however one likes. 
(Ghaemi 2009, 3) 
 
The new options are certainly reasonable (maybe reasonable enough to be 
obvious for psychiatry), but they’re not useful without general guidance as 
to how they should be used. 
 
Bolton and Gillett propose that this problem can be resolved at the level of 
research, where new evidence for the relevance of psychosocial factors in 
specific conditions has now been developed. Clinicians can do without 
general principles for choosing between bio, psycho, and social options, 
they suggest. BPS practice can be accomplished purely by applying 
information from research about specific psychosocial factors for specific 
conditions. This approach goes a long way toward aligning the BPSM with 
evidence-based medicine, and I am very much in favor of that kind of 
effort. In the process, however, it overlooks Engel’s vision for BPS 
practice, the risk it creates in providing diagnostic options without 
diagnostic guidance, and the sense in which that gap has been filled by 
ontological confusion.  
 
First, discourse about the BPSM, including Bolton and Gillette’s, often 
fails to appreciate Engel’s rich picture of the clinical interview. In “How 
much longer must medicine’s science be bound by a seventeenth century 
world view?” Engel directly opposes the idea that the clinical relevance of 
the BPSM could play out purely through the application of research, and 
his arguments on this point may be the most convincing we find in his 
work. He explains in detail exactly how the clinical interview is a “means 
of data collection and processing” (Engel 1992, 338) that’s central to BPS 
practice. When our understanding of medical science excludes 
“information that is only accessible through the medium of human 
exchange” (Engel 1992, 338), he insists, we have misapplied the 
seventeenth-century paradigm in a way that compromises the goals of 
medical science. 
 
This material is very helpful when it comes to the order of explanation 
between medical science and medical humanism. It’s not that the BPSM 
advances a humanistic vision of patient as person, and then insists that 
medical science should adapt to humanism. On the contrary, Engel 
suggests that “appeals to humanism” are “ephemeral and insubstantial (…) 
when not based on rational principles” (Engel 1977, 135). We begin with 
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conceptual foundations, in other words, at the point where we clarify the 
scope and methods of medicine as a science, then this scientific vision 
forces us toward humanism (O’Leary 2021). Good medical science 
recognizes the relevance of biological, psychological and social factors, 
then it gathers data about those factors through a scientific approach to the 
clinical interview. That approach best succeeds when it humanizes patient 
and doctor, and in this sense, good science actually demands good ethics.   
 
To my mind, this is Engel at his best, and all of this richness dissolves 
when we imagine that BPS practice could be a matter of simply applying 
psychosocial research in the clinic. Unfortunately, Engel’s account of the 
clinical interview still leaves us entirely unclear about how to distinguish 
between biological, psychological and social explanations in the diagnostic 
process. Bolton and Gillett actually frame the question perfectly in Chapter 
4:  
 
While disease is contextualised in the person as a whole, the 
immediate question is where the dysfunctional process is 
located: which system within the whole is dysfunctional, 
causing problems for the whole? (Bolton and Gillett 2019, 256) 
 
Second, discourse about the BPSM, including Bolton and Gillette’s, often 
fails to recognize how the lack of clinical guidance poses a threat to patient 
safety. When the model opens the door to psychosocial diagnosis for 
bodily symptoms in everyday practice, clearly it opens the door to a new 
and threating form of diagnostic error. 
 
Diagnostic clarity is not the norm in medicine, surprising as that may be, 
at least not in outpatient care. In fact, as the UK’s National Health Service 
understands things, “on average, 52% of patients accessing outpatient 
services have medically unexplained symptoms” (Joint Commissioning 
Panel for Mental Health 2017, 6-7). And while medical research and 
education are intensely focused on diagnosis, and treatment implied by 
diagnosis, they are essentially silent when it comes to developing 
directives for managing this very sizeable portion of cases.  
  
Bolton and Gillett trust that “medical and clinical psychological textbooks” 
contain “scientific details” (Bolton and Gillett 2019, 119) that tell 
clinicians how to safely manage cases where biomedical and psychosocial 
explanations both remain possible, but that faith is wholly unfounded.  
Since the advent of the BPSM, recommendations for managing these cases 
have not been based on medical science at all, and they have not been 
evaluated by medical researchers for safety or reliability. Instead, practice 
in this area has been guided by research in psychiatry, specifically, research 
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produced and reviewed within the small subdiscipine of psychiatry known 
as psychosomatic medicine (or sometimes “consultation-liaison 
psychiatry”).   
 
Third, the need for clinical guidance has been met in psychosomatic 
medicine not by safety-tested science, but by wrangling about dualism.  
What makes the clinical problem so pressing, in other words, is that it 
combines in disastrous ways with the problem of ontological incoherence.   
In 1984, Schwab explained, for example, that according to “the established 
principles of psychosomatic medicine”, in the great many cases where 
diagnosis remains elusive, clinicians should avoid “viewing the patient 
dichotomously as being ‘organic or functional’” (Schwab 1985, 584).  
Instead of seeking clarity about the presence of disease, that is to say, a 
good BPS clinician will “conceptualize the patient as a total person, a 
psychobiological unit” (Schwab 1985, 584).     
 
More recently, Creed and colleagues clarify the importance of avoiding 
“dualistic thinking” where we “regard symptoms as either organic or 
nonorganic/psychological”. Instead, the BPS clinician should manage 
unexplained symptoms with deliberate diagnostic vagueness, making sure 
never to “force these disorders into either a ‘mental’ or ‘physical’ 
classification” (Creed et al. 2010, 5). 
    
It is certainly possible for philosophical ideas to play a useful role in the 
challenge of distinguishing conditions with primarily biological causes 
from those with primarily psychosocial causes. Indeed, it’s hard to see how 
we can understand that question without philosophical ideas about mind 
and body. Philosophy can be productive for medicine, though, only to the 
extent that it’s supported with sound reasoning that’s continuous with, and 
consistent with, science. In the borderlands between medicine and 
psychiatry, however, the BPSM’s ontological confusion reaches its most 
incoherent pitch. Here Engel’s defining demand to extend medicine’s 
focus beyond body has somehow become a demand to equate mind with 
body at all times. The recommendation to see both mind and body as vital 
contributors to health has become a demand never to engage in practices 
that distinguish one from the other.  
 
Even if we could defend these ideas in their own right, we cannot possibly 
defend them as consistent with the defining ideas of holism. More 
importantly, we cannot defend them as consistent with even the lowest 
standards for safety in medical science. By definition, cases of diagnostic 
uncertainty are cases where the possibility of biological disease remains, 
so these are cases where a recommendation to avoid biological clarity 
requires an extraordinarily high bar of scientific evidence. What it needs is 
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a consistent standard for determining when the possibility of biological 
disease can reasonably be set aside, and biomedical research that 
rigorously evaluates the safety of that standard for the wide range of 
patients who suffer from undiagnosed symptoms. What it has is the 
boogeyman of “dualism”, an imagined imperative, borne of Engel’s own 
confusion, to avoid diagnostic practice that “separates mind and body” at 
all costs.   
 
Though medicine’s research review system would root out these 
recommendations, research in psychosomatic medicine is not reviewed in 
the medical system. While medical textbooks and practice standards defer 
to psychosomatic medicine when it comes to principles for practice with 
medically unexplained symptoms, the research that drives these principles 
circumvents the filtering process for medical science. This too is the result 
of ontological incoherence. Because the BPSM proposes that biological 
and psychosocial factors are both relevant for medical practice, but it fails 
to provide guidance on how to manage that distinction, we have imagined 
that we can hand off vital matters of biomedical safety––for a very 
substantial portion of outpatients––to research and review within a 
subdiscipline of psychiatry. That, quite clearly, is a scientific mistake. 
  
It should not be surprising that in the area where BPS ontology is poised 
to play its most direct and substantial clinical role, right there in the mind-
body borderlands, we find recommendations for practice that are 
demonstrably problematic. Deep conceptual confusion rarely leads to 
empirical success for any science, and medicine is no exception to that rule. 
 
 
4. Conclusions: New Holism 
 
Bolton and Gillett’s book is probably the best we can do when it comes to 
propping up the BPSM as a model for medical science. In that sense it may 
be most instructive by example. On the basis of the model itself, even with 
considerable philosophical ingenuity, we cannot escape the BPSM’s 
entrenched philosophical confusions, and we cannot avoid the dangerous 
ramifications of those confusions in everyday practice.   
 
Fortunately, we can reject the BPSM without accepting the biomedical 
model. In fact, we can reject it even as we accept that biological, 
psychological and social factors each play an inextricable role in human 
health. To do so is just to put our collective foot down, to insist that as 
holists we can do better, that the inchoate bag of ideas put forth by George 
Engel is both wise and inadequate, both essential and utterly absurd. 
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When a holist rejects the BPSM she does not advance a version of medicine 
where the patient becomes, once again, a body, where autonomy yields, 
once again, to parentalism. On the contrary, as a holist she holds those 
ideas in such high regard that she demands a sound foundation for them, a 
conceptual depth and consistency that’s worthy of the task at hand. This 
demand is entirely in keeping with Engel’s vision, with his suggestion that 
“appeals to humanism” are “ephemeral and insubstantial (…) when not 
based on rational principles” (Engel 1977, 135). Because humanism 
matters, we cannot achieve it on the cheap. To understand its roots, and its 
necessity, medicine needs to get its philosophical house in order.   
 
The defining idea of holism is that medicine makes no sense, not in its 
humanity and not in its science, without the reality of human experience.  
We pursue the practice of medicine, and indeed we recognize it as morally 
imperative, because disease causes terrible experiences, and ultimately the 
cessation of experience. This point is so deeply obvious to those in the 
medical professions that it’s a struggle even to imagine what it would mean 
for philosophers to question it, and to reject it, as they often do. It is helpful 
to note, too, that the reality of experience was no less obvious in medicine 
before Engel than it has been since. Regardless of the BMM’s commitment 
to objective scientific methods, and regardless of its consensus that the 
realm of experience lies outside the scope of medicine, the medical 
profession has never denied, or even imagined denying, the reality of 
experience. It has always pursued medicine for the purpose of improving 
and protecting experience. It has always accepted facts of first-person 
experience as medicine’s motivating data (O’Leary 2021).   
 
In this sense, Engel’s holistic vision was more a confession than a 
revelation. Without metaphysical specifics, it simply and broadly pointed 
out that human beings are experiencing beings, and that somehow, 
maintaining medicine’s scientific commitment, we must recognize that in 
order for medicine to succeed. In effect, holism set out to position 
medicine’s foundation somewhere within the framework of philosophy of 
mind, but with the BPSM that effort could not have been a more colossal 
failure. Not only has the BPSM failed to clarify medicine’s philosophical 
position on mind and body. It has created, and in fact entrenched, a 
compendium of pseudo-philosophical jargon so incoherent as to make 
medical holism anathema to philosophy. 
 
Holism should have inspired a conjoining of medicine with philosophy, a 
unified effort to understand experience in the context of medical science, 
and to apply that understanding to improve clinical practice. Instead, the 
language of the BPSM so distorted medicine’s mind-body position that we 
now find ourselves demanding and rejecting dualism in the same breath––
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not now and then, but as a defining feature of medicine’s conceptual dogma 
(O’Leary 2020). 
 
If we let go of the jumble of platitudes that is the BPSM––the equivocation 
on dualism, the unsupported prohibition on “separation”, the imperative to 
“integrate” as if we have the power to change how mind and body are 
related––we can begin to fix this problem. We can accept medical holism 
as the metaphysical open door that it is, just a willingness to recognize the 
reality of experience, and the sense in which that reality forces medicine to 
address biological, psychological and social aspects of health. And we can 
finally characterize that perspective in accurate philosophical terms: as 
acceptance of consciousness in the context of medical science.2  
  
This will not entirely resolve the question of medicine’s position on 
dualism, and it will not explain how subjective experience can play a 
central role in objective medical science, but it will position medicine in 
the territory of nonreductive physicalism and property dualism, and that 
will make it possible to address medicine’s basic ontological questions in 
a serious way. More than that, regardless of our answers to those questions, 
medical practice can readily be improved purely through recognition that 
a holist does distinguish conscious states from the brain states (or body 
states) with which they’re correlated. This clarity makes it possible to 
develop practice recommendations for unexplained symptoms that are 
based on medical science rather than unsupported dogma about avoiding 
separation of mind and body. 
 
In truth, we work with a placeholder in all fields where a sound 
philosophico-scientific picture of consciousness should be, and in this 
sense perhaps medicine can make an invaluable contribution. As an effort 
to improve and protect embodied experience through science, medicine is 
the mind-body problem writ large, with stakes that make the difference 
between wellness and suffering, health and disease, life and death for real 
persons. In a sense, medicine is the conscience of consciousness studies––
or at least it would be if it took part. We are the applied science that keeps 
it real, the science that absolutely cannot do without experience as 
experience, the science where misunderstanding of mind and body will 
play out as real human suffering in the real world. 
 
Bolton and Gillett are entirely right that “Engel’s proposal of the 
biopsychosocial model was audacious” (Bolton and Gillett 2019, 89).  
 
2 By ‘consciousness’ I mean, specifically, phenomenal consciousness, following Block: “Phenomenal 
consciousness is experience; the phenomenally conscious aspect of a state is what it is like to be in that 
state. The mark of access-consciousness, by contrast, is availability for use in reasoning and rationally 
guiding speech and action” (Block 1995, 228). 
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What’s audacious about it, though, is easy to miss. We take the reality of 
experience for granted in the context of medicine, and we take the 
possibility of medical science for granted, as well we should. What we 
should learn from Engel, most audaciously and most profoundly, is that we 
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